Reforming Ethical Oversight Mechanisms for Constitutional Court Justices in Indonesia
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Relevance. The integrity of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia, as one of the judicial authorities in the post-reform constitutional system, demands not only independence but also ethical accountability of its justices. While Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution and Law No. 48 of 2009 safeguard judicial independence, oversight mechanisms particularly ethical ones remain limited and internally controlled. The abolition of the Constitutional Court Honorary Council of Appeals (Majelis Kehormatan Banding) and the lack of external checks have raised critical questions about due process, institutional legitimacy, and legal certainty in judicial ethical enforcement.
Methods and Methodology. This research adopts a normative legal method, utilizing statute, case, and conceptual approaches. Primary legal sources include the 1945 Constitution, Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Powers, Law No. 24 of 2003 and its amendments on the Constitutional Court, and Constitutional Court Regulations (PMK). These are analyzed alongside decisions of the Honorary Council (MKMK), academic literature, and comparative doctrines on judicial accountability and ethics.
Results. The findings reveal significant institutional and procedural weaknesses in the current ethical oversight system. The absence of an appeal mechanism against MKMK decisions and the concentration of oversight within the Court itself reduce transparency, weaken checks and balances, and potentially undermine public trust. Although the MKMK is tasked with maintaining judicial ethics, its structural dependency, lack of external participation, and limited procedural safeguards raise concerns about fairness and impartiality in high-stakes disciplinary decisions.
Conclusion and Discussion. This study argues for a comprehensive reconstruction of the ethical oversight framework for Constitutional Court justices. Reform is needed to enhance the independence of the MKMK, reestablish a credible appellate body, and institutionalize procedural guarantees in line with the principles of due process of law. Legal reform should also clarify the consequences of ethical violations and establish clearer norms for proportional sanctions. These efforts are essential to restore public confidence and ensure the Court’s legitimacy as the guardian of the Constitution.
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